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NOTES

Applying United States v. Stein to
New York's Indigent Defense Crisis
SHOW THE POOR SOME LOVE TOO
I.

INTRODUCTION

Visualize for a moment that you are a criminal defense
attorney at the Legal Aid Society and represent indigent
defendants in Queens, New York.' Despite the fact that you
currently are more than busy working sixty to seventy hours
per week2 to manage your open caseload representing 100
defendants, forty-five of whom have been indicted for felonies, 3
your supervisor hands you a file to represent yet another client.
Your new client, Francisco Rodriguez, has been accused of
robbing an elderly lady in a busy part of town. Unfortunately,
because of your overwhelmingly demanding schedule, you are
unable to approach Francisco until the day of his first court

' "Each year, the [Criminal Practice of the Legal Aid Society of New York]
represents clients in approximately 220,000 indigent criminal cases in trial, appellate
and parole revocation proceedings and serves as the primary public defender in New
York City. The Criminal Practice handles criminal cases at the trial level, ranging in
seriousness from disorderly conduct to non-capital first degree murder." The Legal Aid
Society Criminal Practice, http://www.legal-aid.orglen/whatwedo/criminalpractice.aspx
(last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
2 Public defenders in Monroe County, New York, report that on average they
work sixty to seventy hours per week, including nights and weekends. THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR
available at
2006),
(June 16,
46
CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/
SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG REPORT].
' In Queens, attorneys at the Legal Aid Criminal Defense Division have on
average an open caseload of 90-100 cases. This is in line with the average caseloads of
attorneys with other Divisions in New York City, such as Brooklyn and the Bronx.
SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 131.
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appearance. 4 At this meeting, Francisco adamantly denies any
wrongdoing, but the fact that he recently emigrated from
Mexico and has poor English-speaking ability renders it nearly
impossible to effectively communicate and sufficiently
understand his side of the story. 5
As the right to discovery in New York for a criminal
proceeding between an arrest and the filing of an indictment is
severely limited,6 the prosecution has denied you significant
information concerning the alleged crime. This means being
left unaware of the identity of the witnesses who were present
at the scene of the incident as well as being denied the
opportunity to read the police report. Unfortunately, the lack
of such important information prevents you from gaining
sufficient knowledge to determine the strength of the
prosecution's case.
As much as you want to conduct an independent
investigation concerning the facts surrounding this case, you
know that with your current overwhelming caseload and your
Division's lack of resources to hire private investigators, your
access to information concerning this case is at the mercy of the
prosecution. In fact, the prosecution has informed you that
much of the relevant information necessary to assess your case
will not be supplied to you until jury selection of the trial has
been completed. You would like to file a motion or ask the
court for a pre-trial hearing, but the prosecution has warned
you that unless your client agrees to waive this right, the
prosecutor's office will refuse to negotiate a plea arrangement
with you.8
Feeling ill-equipped to eventually go to trial knowing
that you will not receive any information concerning the
witnesses and other material evidence until after the trial has
commenced, 9 you reluctantly counsel your client to agree to a
plea in return for a confession of guilt. Later, you learn that it
' "During our site visits, we learned that it is not uncommon for indigent
defense attorneys across New York State to meet a client for the first time on the day of
court." SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 67.
5 For a discussion of the dearth of available translator options in New York
to aid public defenders in communicating with foreign-speaking, indigent defendants,
see infra, note 36.
6 See infra notes 50-51.
7 See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
9 For a discussion of the statutory requirements concerning mandatory
prosecutorial disclosure of relevant information, see infra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
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was extremely dark at the time of the crime and that the victim
of the robbery now admits that she had been inebriated and
had not been wearing her prescription glasses. Moreover, due
to her advanced age, she has been suffering from recent bouts
of memory loss. The victim is now unsure whether her
identification of your client was in fact correct. The prosecution
was aware of this, but felt that they did not need to disclose
this information until the start of the trial.1° Unfortunately, as
you are aware, your client has no legal recourse. Francisco
must abide by the procedure in New York City that as a
condition of accepting a guilty plea, one must waive his or her
otherwise constitutionally protected absolute right to an
appeal.11
To an outside observer naive to the criminal justice
system, the above facts seemingly could only occur in a work of
fiction. In actuality, however, this scenario is very plausible
and could occur on any given day. Over the years, a handful of
articles have been written and studies commissioned to
evaluate the status of indigent criminal defense services in the
state of New York.12 These studies include the report of the
Commission on the Future of Indigent Services, formed in part
to "examine the effectiveness of indigent criminal defense
services across the State."13 At the conclusion of that study,
which was aided in its investigations by criminal defense
consulting firm the Spangenberg Group,14 the Commission
10 For the New York statutory law that governs the information prosecutors
must disclose, see supra note 9. For a discussion of the requirements of such
mandatory disclosure under the Constitution, see infra Part III.B.
11 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 148 ("[Ilf a defendant in New
York City entered a guilty plea prior to trial, he or she must waive the right to an
appeal following the guilty plea, rather than have an absolute right to an appeal....
Mhis procedure was developed by the District Attorney's Office as a condition of
accepting a guilty plea and a sentence that was mutually agreed to by the defendant
and prosecutor.").
12 E.g., Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the
Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986-1987); Chester L.
Mirsky, The PoliticalEconomy and Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917-1998, 1997
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 891 (1997); Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, Two-Tier Justice:Lawyers
Often Fail New York's Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at Al; David Rohde, Decline Is
Seen in Legal Help For City's Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at B1.
13 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, FINAL
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (2006), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/index.shtml
REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE]. The other charge of the Commission was to "consider
alternative models of assigning, supervising and financing assigned counsel compatible
with New York's constitutional and fiscal realities." Id.
14 The Commission retained the Spangenberg Group, which is a "criminal
justice research and consulting firm that specializes in research concerning indigent
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came to the same conclusion as numerous previous studies: the
current indigent defense system in New York is in a state of
"crisis."15

Given this grim finding, district attorneys' offices
throughout the state should bear the responsibility of abiding
by their ethical obligations and aid public defenders in order to
ensure the most equitable results.16 Instead, district attorneys'
offices often exacerbate the problem by using New York's
restrictive discovery procedures to their advantage. Examples
of such practices include the refusal to divulge significant
discovery information until immediately prior to a hearing or
trial17 and the coercion of "the defense into not filing motions
and waiving preliminary hearings by refusing to offer pleas if
the defense chooses to litigate."18 Such actions hinder public
defenders in their constitutionally mandated pursuit to provide
an adequate defense.
This Note argues that by withholding access to evidence
as a concerted strategy to pressure indigent defendants to
negotiate unfavorable plea deals and waive rights that are
legally available to them, New York state prosecutors violate
indigents' constitutional rights to due process and effective
counsel. Part II describes the lack of funding that the New
York government provides to state public defenders of
indigents and how prosecutors commonly and unethically take
advantage of this situation by impermissibly violating
indigents' constitutionally protected rights. Part III describes
how the evolution of recent constitutional litigation concerning
indigents' rights gives courts a ripe opportunity to rule that
such prosecutorial acts are unconstitutional. Part IV discusses
a recent federal court decision from the Southern District of
New York, United States v. Stein, where Judge Kaplan
expanded Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to rule that
federal prosecutors' overzealous conduct towards corporate
employee defendants was unconstitutional. Finally, Part V of
this Note argues that using the reasoning in Stein, as well as
other related cases, state courts should rule that state
defense services," and has been under contract with the American Bar Association for
more than 15 years. Id. at 2. It is the most exhaustive study of indigent defense
representation ever endeavored in the state of New York. Id.
15 JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 10 (2006), available at
http://nycourts.gov/admin/stateoijudiciary/soj2006.pdf.
16 See ethics discussion infra note 39.
17 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.
is Id.
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prosecutors violate the Constitution by using their advantages
in resources to pressure defendants.

II.

QUESTIONABLE PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT

A.

The Crisis of the Indigent Defense System

To fully understand how New York state prosecutors
are in a position to take advantage of their overwhelmed
indigent defender adversaries by employing tactics of pressure
and coercion, one must understand the dire situation in which
public defenders find themselves. In June of 2006, at the
request of the Chief Judge of the State of New York, Judith S.
Kaye, more than twenty legal scholars from varying legal
backgrounds 19 released a report on the condition of indigent
defense services in the state of New York.20 The Commission's
results, which reiterated the findings of various other studies
released over the preceding few years, stated that the current
indigent defense system in New York is in a state of "crisis."21
Among the major causes of the crisis are lack of resources,
and,
caseloads,22
ever-increasing
funding,
inadequate
importantly, the fact that many prosecutors manipulate this
situation to take advantage of public defenders for their own
benefit.23 The recommendation that followed was blunt and
direct: "[T]he existing system needs overhaul."24
First, public defenders throughout New York State are
"burdened with heavy caseloads."25 In Monroe County, for
example, even the least experienced attorneys must handle
1000 cases in a given year.2 6 As one can imagine, and as
scholarly articles have confirmed, simultaneously working on
so many different cases severely impairs the amount of time
one can devote to each defendant, and in turn results in

19 Presumably to avoid accusations of self-interest, the vast majority of the
members of the Commission were not current public defenders. Many were professors,
judges, and partners at large New York law firms. See REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra
note 13 (see list of commissioners).
20 See REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 13.
21 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
22 For a discussion of the aforementioned problems, see infra notes 25-38 and
accompanying text.
23 For a discussion of this problem, see infra Part II.B.
24 See REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 13, at 4.
25 SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
26 Id. at 45.
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inadequate representation despite the best ambitions of the
27
attorney.
Often, such large caseloads do not enable Legal Aid
Society attorneys to have any substantial client contact. 28 In
fact, commonly, indigent defense attorneys across New York do
not have the time to meet with a client until that client's initial
court appearance, 29 and often, those conversations take place in
the presence of other inmates or guards.30 Besides violating the
American Bar Association ("ABA") ethical standards for
attorney-client privacy, which require facilities adequate for
private conversations,31 such communications do not allow for
the level of privacy requisite to establish the attorney-client
privilege.32 As a consequence, indigent defendants are often not
in a position where they can comfortably communicate with
27

Various studies over the past decade have reported that such excessive

caseloads-which occur in public defenders' offices throughout the nation-have such
an extremely detrimental impact on the quality of assistance of counsel that it results
in questionably unconstitutional representation even without the examination of
prosecutorial conduct. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes:
The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 656-62 (1986) (section devoted to the "Underfunding of
Defender Offices and the Resulting Inadequate Representation by Counsel"); Douglas
W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary
Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 397-410 (1995) (discussing how excessive
caseloads results in a "lack of meaningful assistance of counsel in capital litigation");
Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders
and Its DisproportionateImpact upon Racial Minorities,22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219,
219-67 (1994) (discussing how "[y]ears of consistently severe underfunding, increased
caseloads and inadequate resources have created a serious crisis in this nation's public
defender system").
21 See, e.g., The New York State Commission on The Future of Indigent
Defense Services Regarding New York's Criminal Defense System (Feb. 11 2005)
(testimony of Donna Lieberman, Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union), available at www.nyclu.org/node/718 [hereinafter Lieberman Testimony]
(claiming that "public defense attorneys fail to visit [their indigent clients] in jail for
weeks or even months at a time, fail to accept or return their phone calls, fail to meet
with them prior to court appearances .. .and fail to otherwise engage in meaningful
communication with them about their case prior to critical stages of criminal
proceedings").
29 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 67.
30 Id.
"[W]e observed communications between attorneys and inmates taking
place in front of other inmates as well as sheriffs or court guards." Id.
31 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, standard 4-3.1(b) (3d ed. 1992).
32 To meet the elements necessary to qualify for attorney-client privilege, a
client does not require absolute privacy, but indeed does require a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 170 n.16 (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 71, cmt. c, illus. 1 (2000)). When disclosures to one's lawyer are made in the
presence of others, the speaker is in effect waiving his or her privilege to
confidentiality, and their lawyer thus can be compelled to testify about the specifics of
the conversation. Id.
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their lawyer concerning the details of their alleged crime. This
leaves their lawyers uninformed concerning possible defenses
and without adequate knowledge to properly assess whether
they should advise their client to accept a plea or go to trial.as
Another source of consternation for the attorneys of
indigent defendants is the disparity of resources available to
them as compared to their adversaries, the state prosecutors.
Not only do prosecutors receive substantially higher
compensation than public defenders, 34 but they also have
greater access to resources, such as crime labs, translators,
35
training budgets, FBI personnel, and expert witnesses.
Furthermore, in many documented instances, foreign-language
interpreters are not available to public defenders, thus making
effective attorney-client communication impossible.36 This
prohibits counsel from making adequate decisions about
whether the best strategy is to recommend pleading guilty for a
lesser sentence or proceeding to trial. Finally, state prosecutors
receive a disproportionate number of state and federal grants
as compared to state public defenders, 37 which once again
results in state prosecutors receiving a substantial advantage.38
B.

Many ProsecutorsManipulate this Situation

Both the ABA Disciplinary Rules and New York rules of
professional conduct state that the role of the prosecutor is not

33

SPANGENBERO REPORT, supra note 2, at 67.

34 Id. at 83-85.
35 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting
Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 292-93 [hereinafter Brennan 1963]
(discussing the superior resources of district attorneys' offices, which, among other
things, have "[l]aboratories, skilled investigators, [and] experts in all areas"); Klein,
supra note 27, at 656-57 ("Relatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of
investigation and other expert assistance in their defense. Their advocates are
overburdened, undertrained, and underpaid.") (citation omitted).
36 See, e.g., Lieberman Testimony, supra note 28 (claiming that attorneys for
indigent defendants "fail to adequately communicate with [said defendants] if they are
limited English speakers"); Lawrence K. Marks & Ronald P. Younkins, Court
Interpreting in New York: A Plan of Action, at 24 (April 2006), available at
httpJ/www.actnyc.org/pdf/court-inter.pdf. ("Justice Courts have no interpreters of their
own, no guidelines for interpreter credentials, no training systems, and no coordination
to harmonize their independent administration of this important area.").
37 See REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 13, at 23.
38 Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 228, 229 (1964) (discussing the "abundant resources for investigation
available to the prosecution").
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to convict at all costs, but rather to seek fairness 9 Therefore,
as a result of the severe lack of time and resources available for
the public defenders in New York to conduct proper
investigations, 4 0 it is of the utmost importance that prosecutors
are cooperative in the disclosure of discovery information that
state public defenders regrettably do not have the opportunity
to obtain. Unfortunately, the opposite often occurs. Many
prosecutors' offices conceal non-exculpatory evidence until as
late as possible in the judicial process, employing this lack of
41
open disclosure as a coercive tactic.
The investigators of The Spangenberg Report discovered
to their dismay that "many prosecutors across the state
routinely fail to disclose important discovery material until
hours or minutes before a contested hearing or trial, severely
hampering the ability of defenders to prepare an adequate
defense."42 New York State's relatively restrictive discovery
statutes,43 commonly referred to as the Rosario rule," permit
the prosecution to delay giving out any information concerning
witnesses who will testify-which is often the critical issue in a
criminal case-until after jury selection at a trial,45 and until
after direct examination in a pre-trial hearing.46 Moreover,
statements of a witness who will not be called to the stand
39 See

ABA

STANDARDS

FOR

PROSECUTION

AND

DEFENSE

FUNCTION:

PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is
to seek justice, not merely to convict."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-13 (1980) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
40 See discussion supra Part II.A.
41 See discussion infra notes 42-66 and accompanying text.
42 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.
" For a comparison of how New York's discovery statutes are particularly
restrictive with respect to other states, the state of Florida allows defense attorneys
access to the names of all people known by the government to have relevant
information to the offense charged, FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.220(b)(1)(A) (LexisNexis
2007), and New Jersey's discovery procedures allow pre-indictment mandatory
discovery in the event of a pre-indictment plea offer, N.J. Ct. R. 3:13-3(a) (2003). The
ABA's recommended standards call for a much greater level of open discovery. ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY, Standard 11-1.1
(1995) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
" Shortly after the court in People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961), laid out
these discovery rules via common law, the New York State Legislature codified them in
New York Criminal Procedure Law. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44, 240.45
(McKinney 2004).
41 In New York, a prosecutor is not obligated to turn over the names,
statements, prior or pending criminal records of witnesses the prosecution intends to
call until "after the jury has been sworn." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney
2004).
46 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.44 (McKinney 2004).
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during a criminal proceeding are often never disclosed. 47 Such
tactics, although allowed by statute, are in stark contrast to the
ABA criminal justice and New York State ethics standards,
which advise fair and early disclosure.4 A large number of legal
49
scholars have furthermore condemned this conduct.
Another aspect of the law that prosecutors unethically
use to their advantage is the limited right to pre-indictment
discovery under either the Federal Constitution 5° or New York
State law.51 In the substantial time period between an arrest
and the suspect being officially charged,52 the amount of
information prosecutors in New York must disclose is quite
restricted. 53 What makes this particularly troubling is that, in
4' The New York criminal procedure laws codified pursuant to Rosario do not
require the prosecution to disclose at any point during a criminal proceeding the
statements of a witness who will not be called to testify. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§
240.44, 240.45 (McKinney 2004); see also, e.g., People v. Perez, 788 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App.
Div. 2005); People v. Slade, 724 N.Y.S.2d 588, 588 (App. Div. 2001); People v. Marsh,
669 N.Y.S.2d 707, 707 (App. Div. 1998).
48 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Standard 11-4.1(a) ("The time
limits should be such that discovery is initiated as early as practicable in the process.
The time limit for completion of discovery should be sufficiently early in the process
that each party has sufficient time to use the disclosed information adequately to
prepare for trial."); Id. Standard 11-1.1(a)(v) (compelling a prosecutor to "minimize the
procedural and substantive inequities among similarly situated defendants"); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) ("[T]he prosecutor should make
timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the
punishment.").
" See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or
Quest For Truth? A ProgressReport, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (1990) (stating "as a general
proposition that the truth-finding function of criminal trial is enhanced when the
prosecution is not allowed to surprise the defendant with its evidence ... but is
required to disclose its case in advance of trial so that defense counsel may carefully
consider and investigate the evidence and prepare her trial tactics and questions");
Brennan 1963, supra note 35, at 282; Traynor, supra note 38, at 249 ("The truth is
most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by reason rather than by
surprise.").
50 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (stating that "[there is no general constitutional right
to discovery in a criminal case"); Cicenia v. Le Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958)
(describing that refusing to supply pre-trial discovery does not violate due process);
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1952). Some federal courts, however, have
ruled that the right to pre-trial discovery does exist in certain limited situations. See
infra notes 109-122.
51 See, e.g., Brown v. Appelman, 672 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (App. Div. 1998)
(upholding the refusal of a defendant's request of pre-indictment discovery).
5' For misdemeanors, prosecutors can withhold discovery information up to
ninety days after the defendant initially appears in court, and for felonies, this period
of time can last for up to six months. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a)(b) (McKinney
2004).
53 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2004). When an indictment
or information is pending, the prosecution is required to disclose only recorded
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light of the fact that an extraordinarily high percentage of
criminal cases are settled pursuant to plea deals before
reaching court,- one would logically assume that this is the
period where transparent discovery would be of the utmost
importance.
For example, for a defense attorney to make an
informed recommendation to his client on whether to attempt
to plea or go to trial, that attorney must have adequate
information to ascertain the strength of the prosecution's case. 55
The ABA Disciplinary Rules reiterate the importance of
sufficient prosecutorial disclosure during the plea bargaining
stage by stating that a prosecutor has a duty to "provide the
defendant with sufficient information to make an informed
plea."56 While one may argue that this delayed discovery
strategy is merely an example of a prosecutor admirably
performing his duties in a zealous manner, the ABA
Disciplinary Rules and New York State Bar Association's
Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility suggest
57
otherwise.
Through this lack of disclosure, prosecutors know that
public defenders are often kept in the dark concerning critical
portions of their indigent defendant's case. Unfortunately,
many state prosecutors use this knowledge to their benefit.
Defenders of indigents are at an extreme disadvantage when
they commit to litigating in court without important
information, such as police reports and witness statements. 58
As a result, it is common for prosecutors to pressure defendants
by threatening to refuse to offer any pleas if the defense takes
statements of the defendant, photographs, the property of the defendant, and scientific
tests of evidence. Id.
' Of the 103,919 felony convictions in New York State in 2005, only 1,861
reportedly came as a result of a court verdict, while 101,552 came as a result of a plea
and the judicial reason for 506 is unknown. New York State Div. of Criminal Justice
Services, Disposition of Felony Arrests: New York State (2006), available at
http'//criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/disposnys.htm.
55 See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The
government's obligation to make [discovery] disclosures is pertinent not only to an
accused's preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or not to plead
guilty.").
56 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Standard 11-1.1(a)(ii).
57 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
5 See David C. Anderson, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Public Defenders in the
Neighborhood: A Harlem Law Office Stresses Teamwork, Early Investigation, NAT'L
INST. JUST. PROGRAM FOCUS 2, 8 (March 1997) (discussing how prosecutors have the
option to give attorneys who represent indigents a great deal of discovery information,
but choose not to, which causes public defenders to often argue ineffectively in front of
a judge, without adequate information on the case at hand).

2007]

U.S. V. STEIN AND INDIGENT DEFENSE

advantage of its right to file motions or initiate pre-trial
hearing. s
Other prosecutors presumably know that with the
constant pressure to improve judicial economy by limiting the
number of in-court proceedings, ° such threats to refuse plea
offers will ring hollow. Often, these prosecutors instead
attempt to coerce a defendant into waiving his or her right to a
pre-trial hearing by threatening to make a defendant's access
to earlier discovery contingent on such a waiver.61 Because of
the importance of pre-trial motions in the course of many
criminal cases, such a concession could be potentially fatal to
the defendant's opportunity for a fair trial.62
The Spangenberg Report learned of additional methods
that district attorneys' offices employ to coerce defendants to
waive other rights as well. One such example is pressuring a
defendant to waive his or her right to a grand jury.63 The
consequence for a defendant refusing to waive this right is that
the defendant will otherwise be charged with the most serious
crime permissible.64 If the indigent defendant chooses to accept
such a coerced waiver, however, the defendant must wait in
police custody while his or her attorney either works out a plea
agreement or decides to litigate without the benefit of knowing
all of the critical information pertaining to the case. Also, in
New York, defendants have the right to appeal their conviction,
even if that conviction resulted from a guilty plea.65 Some
district attorneys' offices, however, have a procedure whereby

59 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.

o Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics
Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1193 (2003) (stating that prosecutors often face
pressure themselves to enter plea agreements to conserve time and resources).
61 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 147.
62 See, e.g., Herman J. F. Hoying, To File or Not to File: The Practical and
Ethical Implications of Motion Practiceon Sentence Negotiations in Capital Cases, 15
CAP. DEF. J. 49, 52-53 (2002) ("An essential part of an attorney's representation of a
criminal defendant is the filing of pretrial motions for such purposes as obtaining
discovery, obtaining more specific information on the charges, challenging the
sufficiency of the indictment and challenging the state's evidence."); Steve Schulhofer,
Effective Assistance On The Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 146
(1986) (discussing how pre-trial hearings aid criminal defense attorneys by providing
insight into the prosecution's case and by narrowing the focus of further investigation).
63 See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 147.
64 Id.
65

See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10 (McKinney 1996).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

prosecutors will only offer plea deals if the defendant agrees to
86
waive this right to an appeal.
Thus, instead of mitigating the detrimental effects of
the under-funded state public defender system, many state
prosecutors in New York ignore their ethical obligations. Sadly,
these prosecutors do practically all that they can within the
bounds of the law to make the situation as inequitable as
possible. In light of these circumstances, many New York state
prosecutors may be in danger of violating indigent defendants'
protected rights under the United States Constitution.
III.

RIGHT TO ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION AND RIGHT
TO DISCOVERY

Through the Sixth Amendment, the Framers ensured
that every citizen of the United States of America had the right
to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."67 Similarly, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, each citizen in the United States
has been given the constitutionally protected right to due
process under the law.6s Since the adoption of these
Amendments, courts have often struggled to determine how
9
these two clauses should be interpreted and applied.6
Over the past fifty years of constitutional jurisprudence,
however, courts have increasingly become more liberal in their
interpretations of these two clauses to protect the rights of
defendants to a fair trial, particularly those defendants who

" See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 2, at 147-48. The power of state
prosecutors to negotiate such plea arrangements is not absolute, however, as some
issues are unwaivable, such as the right to a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 519 (1972), competency to stand trial, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993),
and whether the plea agreement was unconscionable because it was not voluntarily
entered into, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right also is supplied to all citizens of New
York under the New York Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
68 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been used by the Supreme Court to apply nearly all of the Bill of
Rights to the states, including the right to assistance of counsel. 16A AM. JUR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 405 (2007).
69 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal
Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 26 (2005) (discussing "evolving Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence"); Douglas L. Colbert, Connecting Theory and Reality:
Teaching Gideon and Indigent Defendants' Non-Right to Counsel at Bail, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 167, 180 (2006) (discussing the Fifth Amendment's "evolving balance between
individual rights and law enforcement interests"); See generally Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo's Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme
Court's Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in ProtectingFundamentalRights, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV 923 (2006).
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cannot afford counsel.70 Federal courts throughout the country,
at every level, have shown the courage to utilize their
constitutionally mandated power to act as a check on excessive
government power, especially in criminal cases. In light of this
commendable trend, the inappropriate attempts by New York's
state prosecutors to limit the likelihood of a fair criminal
proceeding7l are desirable candidates for courts to prohibit
next. To fully understand why the time is ripe for judicial
intervention, it is instructive to look back at some of the cases
over the past fifty years addressing the constitutionally
protected right to adequate representation as well as the
increasingly liberally constructed right to discovery in a
criminal proceeding.
A.

The Right to Adequate Representation

In 1932, the Supreme Court ruled that indigent
defendants in state courts have a due process right to counsel,
72
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Over thirty years later, in the seminal case, Gideon v.
Wainwright, this right to counsel was finally applied to state
73
courts as an independent Sixth Amendment right as well.
While Gideon clearly established the right to counsel only when
a suspect is indicted for a felony, 7 the Court has subsequently
continued to extend this right to apply to nearly every type of
offense or violation that could potentially lead to jail time, so
long as the defendant has been formally charged during a
judicial proceeding. 75
71
71
72

See discussion infra Part III.A. and Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).

" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The Court ruled that like
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment also attaches to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This ruling occurred twenty-three
years after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was first established in federal court
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). The Court has also ruled that this
right attaches at the time when judicial proceedings have been initiated against the
defendant, "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
4 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
5 For a few classes of offenses that the courts have extended this right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (the right to an attorney for an offense that could result in any type of
incarceration, including a misdemeanor); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (the right to
an attorney in juvenile court); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 357-58 (1963)
(the right of criminal defendants to an attorney on the first appeal).
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The Supreme Court has decided two different types of
cases where a defendant is exposed to ineffectiveness of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. One set of cases focuses on the
ineptness of the attorney.7 6 In the other set of cases, the focus is
7
on the unfairness of the system as a whole.
McMann v. Richardson,78 decided in 1970, was arguably
the first case in which the Supreme Court held that the
incompetence of a defense attorney was a critical constitutional
issue. In McMann, the Court extended a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right, beyond considerations of the nature of the
79
offense, to require the right to "effective assistance of counsel."
Fourteen years later, the Court in Strickland v. Washington
established the standard of review by which to judge whether a
defense attorney's representation failed to meet adequate legal
assistance standards under the Sixth Amendment. °
In Strickland, the Court ruled that a defendant
appealing under Sixth Amendment grounds must overcome a
"strong presumption" that representation was constitutionally
adequate. 81 To meet this burden, the indigent defendant must
prove first that his or her counsel's quality of performance "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." 8 2 This dubious
feat will be met, for instance, when attorneys do not conduct a
sufficient investigation to put themmselves in a position where
they are able to make informed decisions on behalf of their
clients.- Once the defense counsel's inadequacy is sufficiently
proved, the defendant next must prove prejudice. This means
that, but for the substandard representation, a "reasonable
probability" exists that the defendant would have reached a
more favorable result8 In Strickland, the Court's "strong
presumption" proved too heavy of a burden, as the Court ruled
that the attorney's representation was not poor enough to
violate the Sixth Amendment.- In fact, the Court refused to

76

For a discussion of Supreme Court cases establishing this right, see infra

notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
77 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).
78 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
79 Id. at 771 n.14 (emphasis added).

'0 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 688.
83

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 690-91 (1984).

Id. at 694.
s5 Id. at 699-700.
84
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find representation poor enough to meet this standard for
another fourteen years.
Such a decision finally arrived in 2000 with Williams v.
Taylor, when the Supreme Court used the test laid out in
Strickland to rule that the attorney of an indigent defendant
failed to meet Sixth Amendment standards.86 The Court ruled
that the defendant's counsel was constitutionally inadequate as
a result of the counsel's failure to gain ample information
through a sufficient investigation, which prohibited him from
making qualified recommendations to his client.87 Only three
years later, the Supreme Court, in Wiggins v. Smith, once
again ruled that an attorney failed to meet the Strickland
Sixth Amendment test for adequate representation as a result
of an inadequate investigation.- As one can see, since the turn
of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has placed a
renewed emphasis on the importance of a defense counsel's
duty to discover material information concerning his or her
client's case.8 9 When this duty has been violated, the Court
recently has been more willing to rule that a defendant has
received representation that is prejudicial, and therefore hold
that defense counsel has failed the test of adequate
representation.
In addition to the Strickland test, which focuses on
attorney inadequacies, the Supreme Court has also ruled that a
defendant can permissibly claim that his or her Sixth
Amendment rights were violated based on a systemic problem
or structural defect. This occurs when "'although counsel is
available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that
86 529 U.S. 362, 395-97 (2000) (stating that the defendant's counsel failed to
conduct an adequate investigation to present sufficient mitigating evidence at the
sentencing stage).
87 Id. at 395-96.

" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
8' See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1101 (2004) [hereinafter Too Little, Too Late] (stating that
"the Supreme Court has given much more vigor to defense counsel's Sixth-Amendmentbased duty to investigate."); Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice
and the 2002-2003 United States Supreme Court Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 874
(2004) (stating that "Wiggins v. Smith . . . may signal a departure from decisions in
recent terms where ineffective assistance of counsel claims were greeted with a great
deal of skepticism by the Justices"); Victor L. Streib, Standing Between the Child and
the Executioner: The Special Role of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases,
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 67, 85 (2003) (discussing that after Wiggins v. Smith, there have
been signs showing "the Court's willingness to carefully scrutinize the performance of
capital defense counsel at key stages, particularly as to discovery and presentation of
mitigating evidence").
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any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
trial."' 9o It is also critical that the defect's negative
consequences are not isolated to one section of the case, but
rather affect the possibility of fairness in every aspect of the
criminal proceeding. 91 To reach this heavy burden, it is
important that this systemic defect occur in a stage of
prosecution that is critical in the course of litigation. 92 When
this test is met, a court need not even inquire into the defense
attorney's level of effectiveness to rule that an indigent
defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights. 91
The Supreme Court's first case finding that a pre-trial
structural defect violated the defendants' constitutional rights
came in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama.94 There, the Court
pointed to how late in the litigation process the attorney for the
indigent defendants was appointed; given this fact, the Court
95
ruled it was unreasonable to expect adequate representation.
This allowed the Court, without inquiring into the efforts of the
defense attorney, to rule that the defendants did not have the
opportunity to receive adequate representation.96 Significantly,
the Court stressed the importance of the lawyer's role in the
pre-trial stages of litigation, where the discovery of evidence
and informed consultation are critical. 97 Since Powell, the Court
has found many other "critical" stages of litigation to be so
important as to make a defect concerning such stage a per se
violation of the Sixth Amendment. 98
90

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1984) (quoting and citing as

an example Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
91 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991).
92 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 660-62.
Id. at 662.
287 U.S. 45 (1932). Although it had not yet explicated the two separate
tests, the Court has in subsequent years stated that Powell was the first case to
consider a structural defect of the criminal justice system as a controlling
constitutional issue. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-60.
95 Powell, 287 U.S. at 57-58.
96 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60.
17 Powell, 287 U.S. at 59. "Neither they nor the court could say what a
prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was
made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given." Id.
98 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) ("[Tihere are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error . . . ."). See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 254, 263-64 (1986)
(discriminatory exclusion of members of the accused's race from a grand jury);
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 168, 177-78, 177 n.8 (1984) (right to selfrepresentation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (right to public
93

94
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The Right to Discovery for Indigent Defendants

In addition to ensuring that indigent defendants are
afforded the right to sufficient attorney representation, the
Supreme Court has also invoked the Sixth Amendment to
ensure that government prosecutors cannot take advantage of
attorneys representing indigents by refusing to give them
important information through discovery. 9 Considering the
great disadvantage public defenders are exposed to as a result
of the dearth of resources provided for them, especially when
compared to prosecutors' offices, 1°° such Supreme Court
intervention has been essential to maintain any semblance of
fairness.
Modern common law concerning the prosecutor's duty to
disclose information dates back to 1935, when the Court stated
in dictum that that the government's knowing use of perjury
violates the constitutional right to due process. 01 1 This ruling
was later expanded upon when the Court increased the reach
of due process violations to include the act of state authorities
purposefully suppressing evidence that is favorable to the

defendant. 102
The Supreme Court, in the 1963 benchmark case Brady
v. Maryland, continued to focus on the permissible manner in
which prosecutors may handle and disclose evidence following
an indictment.103 The Court ruled that a prosecutor violates due
process when he or she suppresses exculpatory evidence, or in
other words, material information that is requested by the
defendant and is favorable to the defendant's claim.104 After
trial); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 560, 567-68 (1958) (right against coerced
confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (right to an impartial judge).
See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
'oo See discussion supra Part II.A.
101 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
102 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942).
103 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
104 Id. at 87. The Court later more concretely defined "exculpatory evidence"
as information, which if suppressed by the government, would "undermine confidence
in the verdict." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). Over the years, the Brady
Rule has evolved to mean that prosecutors are not obligated to supply a defendant's
counsel with exculpatory information that the prosecution does not know exists. See 35
GEO. L.J. REV. CRIM. PROc. 324, 330-31 (2006). However, the prosecution may not
purposely avoid discovering exculpatory evidence as a means to avoid the mandatory
disclosure of such damaging information if it does exist. See Shane M. Cahill, NOTE,
United States v. Ruiz: Are Plea Agreements Conditioned on Brady Waivers
Unconstitutional?, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 6 (citing 21A AM. JUR. 2D § 1271
(1998)).
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this decision, though, many questions remained as to what
type of evidence fits the description of "material" and
"exculpatory."105
In Giglio v. United States, the Court ruled that such
exculpatory evidence includes information concerning the
credibility of witnesses who are important enough in the case
as to be a reliable indication of whether the defendant is guilty
or innocent. 06 Soon thereafter, the Court broadened the Brady
Rule by holding that in order to promote the concept of the
right to a fair trial, the prosecution has a due process duty to
disclose evidence that is clearly favorable to the defendant,
even without the defendant's precise request. 10 7 More than two
decades after Brady, in Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court
once again re-emphasized the defense's need to rely on the
government for discovery when it ruled that a defense attorney
violated his client's right to due process by refusing to demand
that prosecutors disclose material evidence. 1°8
Later, in 1998, the Second Circuit extended this
discovery right to all stages of litigation-including the pretrial plea bargaining stage. 10 9 "The government's obligation [to
hand over material evidence to the defendant] is pertinent not
only to an accused's preparation for trial," the Second Circuit
wrote, "but also to his determination of whether or not to plead
guilty."110 The court continued that "the validity of the plea
must be reassessed if it resulted from 'impermissible conduct
by state agents.""" Therefore, according to the Second Circuit,
100

See H. Lee Sarokin

& William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?

Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43
RUTGERS L. REv. 1089, 1102-03 (1991).
'O6 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
107 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). Despite this rule, the
Court did not overturn the defendant's conviction, because the prosecution's error was
not so significant, given the facts of the case, to be considered prejudicial. Id. at 114.
1o Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). Although the Court's
inquiry focused on the inadequacies of the defense attorney, the Court could not have
ruled that the defense counsel's errors were so significantly egregious if not for the
Court's belief that access to evidence through the prosecutor's office was required to
comport with notions of a fair trial.
109 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998).
110 Id. The court wrote, "The defendant is entitled to make that decision with
full awareness of favorable material evidence known to the government." Id.; see also
United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The Government's
obligation to disclose Brady materials is pertinent to the accused's decision to plead
guilty; the defendant is entitled to make that decision with full awareness of
favorable... evidence known to the Government.").
"' Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
757 (1970)).
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due process also prohibits the prosecution's refusal to turn over
evidence that is materially favorable to a defendant prior to
that defendant's plea of guilty.112
In Unites States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court put the
Second Circuit's holding in doubt, however, by ruling that
federal prosecutors are not required to disclose "impeachment
information relating to any informants or other witnesses"
before entering into a binding plea agreement. 113 The Court
ruled that Brady material did not apply to a plea agreement
because, in such a case, the defendant's confession is
"voluntary."114 Further, the Court noted, it is too uncertain
whether impeachment information would actually aid the
defendant significantly enough to justify categorizing pleabargaining as a "critical" stage of litigation that traditionally
deserves stricter judicial scrutiny.115 Therefore, the Ruiz Court
held that, prior to entering a plea agreement, the principles of
due process do not require that a defendant be made aware of
information that undermines the credibility of witnesses whom
the defendant was told might testify at trial.116
Subsequently, however, various state and district courts
throughout the country have found several grounds to
distinguish Ruiz from other cases involving the lack of
disclosure given to defendants prior to plea bargain
agreements. 117 Courts have interpreted Ruiz narrowly to hold
that the permissible suppression of material information prior
to a plea bargain applies exclusively to the impeachment of
witnesses.118 Therefore, even after Ruiz, prosecutorial
suppression of non-impeachment exculpatory information prior
to a plea bargain would be unconstitutional. 119
Id.
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
114 Id. at 629.
115 Id. at 629-30. For a further analysis of the importance of identifying a
stage of litigation as critical for due process and Sixth Amendment analysis, see supra
notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
116 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
117 See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text; see also infra note 188 for
112

113

further analysis distinguishing United States v. Ruiz.
118 See, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App'x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005); Garrett v. United States, Civil
No. 2:05cv323, Crim. No. 2:03cr59, 2006 WL 1647314, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. June 13, 2006);
State v. Harris, 680 N.W.2d 737, 750 n.15 (Wis. 2004).
119 McCann, 337 F.3d at 788 (stating that, given the distinction in Ruiz
between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence, "it is highly likely that
the Supreme Court would find a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors ...
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Additionally, courts have ruled that evidence directly
related to the character of the charge against the defendant is
critical to the point where the information must be disclosed to
the defendant during the plea bargaining stage. 120 If this
information is suppressed, the actions will lead a court to doubt
the voluntariness of the defendant's admission of guilt.121
Furthermore, even in the context of suppressing impeachment
information, courts have ruled that a defendant's confession
is "involuntary" and therefore inadmissible if it was caused
by the prosecutor's failure to disclose a witness's material
122
statements.
IV.

UNITED STATES V. STEIN

During the past century, courts have struggled to
establish concrete rules that strike the most equitable balance
between prosecutors'
legitimate interest in zealously
prosecuting criminals and the rights of defendants to a fair
criminal proceeding.123 In the summer of 2006, Judge Kaplan
reignited this debate when he wrote an opinion in the district
court case United States v. Stein that extended defendants'
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, while substantially
limiting strategic prosecutorial pre-trial and pre-indictment
actions.124 Because the defendants in this case-all of whom
were employees of the accounting firm KPMG, which the
government was
investigating concurrently with the
employees-are wealthy, white-collar corporate employees

have knowledge of a criminal defendant's factual innocence but fail to disclose such
information to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea").
120 United States v. Villalobos, 333 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003) (before
plea, a defendant who is charged in a drug-related offense must be informed of the
amount of drugs to be used as evidence when the quantity of drugs is an element of the
defendant's sentence). This case followed a similar ruling in United States v. Minore,
292 F.3d 109, 117 (9th Cir. 2002).
121 Villalobos, 333 F.3d at 1076.
122 See Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding
that the defendant's admission of guilt may not be legally considered voluntary because
the government failed to disclose that a key witness had recanted a prior statement
made which implicated the defendant in a crime). "[Blefore entering a guilty plea[, a
defendant] must make two showings in order to set that plea aside as involuntary.
First, he must show that some egregiously impermissible conduct
antedated the
entry of his plea. Second, he must show that the misconduct influenced his decision to
plead guilty or, put another way, that it was material to that choice." Id. (citations
omitted).
123 See discussion supra Part III.B.
124 United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

U.S. V. STEIN AND INDIGENT DEFENSE

2007]

involved in a tax-shelter scheme,125 Stein, at first blush, may
seem as far removed from state prosecutors' actions towards
indigent defendants as possible. A closer examination,
however, shows that if Judge Kaplan's reasoning is applied to
other contexts, the consequences of the case could be
significantly more far-reaching than one would think.
A.

Background of the Case

United States v. Stein considered whether federal
prosecutors violated the Constitution by their conduct during
the pre-trial investigative stage of a criminal proceeding.126
Specifically, the case centered on the validity of the Thompson
Memorandum, an internal memorandum obligating Assistant
U.S. Attorneys ("AUSAs") to pressure corporations under
investigation to refuse to advance legal fees to its employees.127
As per the instructions of the Thompson Memorandum, federal
prosecutors had a duty to inform the directors of companies
under investigation that the federal government was
128
considering whether to indict the company.
125
126

See id. at 338.
Id. at 335-36.

127 Id.
at 336-37. The origins of the Thompson Memorandum date back to
1999, when then-U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder distributed a document
entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations" (known as the Holder Memorandum),
which laid out factors that a prosecutor generally should consider when making a
decision whether to indict a corporation. Id. Although it clearly expressed that it
was not binding, the Holder Memorandum stated that the decision by a business
that is under investigation to advance attorneys fees to its personnel might be
construed by the government as evidence of protecting guilty employees, and thus it
could be a significant factor in a decision whether to indict the company. Id.; see
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Bringing
Criminal
Charges Against Corporations
(June 16,
1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docslreports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
Following
the high-profile investigations of many large companies, such as Enron, Tyco
International and ImClone, just to name a few, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson, with the intention of modifying the Holder Memorandum, issued a new
memorandum, entitled "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations"
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. The modification most significant to this Note
is that unlike the Holder Memorandum, which was a non-binding suggestion, the
Thompson Memorandum is binding, and thus obliges Assistant U.S. Attorneys to
consider the advancing of legal fees as a factor in favor of the decision to indict. Stein I,
435 F. Supp. at 338.
128 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 127. In this case, the IRS referred
the case to the Department of Justice, which turned it over the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339. In the initial meeting between the lawyers representing
KPMG and the Assistant U.S. Attorneys involved in the investigation, the government
prosecutors pointed specifically to the Thompson Memorandum and made comments
which the Court believed were reasonably "understood by both KPMG and government

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

Federal prosecutors were further obliged to advise the
corporate directors of factors that the government would
consider indicative of whether the company was cooperating
with the government's investigation.129 Prosecutors would
inform them that satisfying these factors may positively
contribute to a potential decision not to indict.130 One such
factor was whether the company agreed to refuse to advance
legal fees to its employees who are concurrently under
investigation, except when such advances are required by
law.131
In his decision, Judge Kaplan ruled that this practice
violated the defendant employees' due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment, as well as their right to adequate
representation under the Sixth Amendment.132 Many legal
scholars saw this decision as an increase in defendants' rights
under the Constitution that exceeded any past established
133
precedent.
representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by KPMG... could well count
against KPMG in the government's decision whether to indict the firm." Id. at 341-44.
Ultimately, the government and KPMG agreed that KPMG would cap the
advancement of legal fees for their employees at $400,000, but all monetary
advancement would immediately cease if the employee invoked his or her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination or if the employee was charged with
criminal misconduct. Id. at 345-46.
129 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 127.
130 See id.
131 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345-46. In response to Judge Kaplan's decision,
current Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty amended the Thompson
Memorandum in a document widely referred to as the "McNulty Memorandum,"
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf. Of the changes
McNulty made, he stated that except in rare circumstances, when determining
whether a company under investigation is cooperating, federal prosecutors may not
consider whether that company is advancing legal fees to its employees.
132 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. at 336-37. Judge Kaplan later granted the motions of
thirteen of the defendants to dismiss their indictments on the grounds that there was
sufficient evidence that showed that KPMG definitively would have paid for the
individual defendants' legal fees but for the interference of the USAO and the
Thompson Memorandum. United States v. Stein (Stein II), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). The interference was so reprehensible, wrote Kaplan, that it "shocks
the conscience." Id. at 412-15. A third ground on which Judge Kaplan relied for his
2006 decision that the defendant employees were entitled to the advancement of legal
fees was the doctrine of implied contract. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336-37. However,
as that doctrine falls outside of the scope of this Note, Judge Kaplan's reasoning
concerning that area of law will not be discussed.
133 See, e.g., Rodney Peck, United States v. Stein: DOJ Policy Threatening
Companies with Indictment Based Upon Advancement of Employee Legal Fees
Ruled Unconstitutional, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Aug. 9, 2006, at 4 ("The ruling...
is the first major criticism from the bench of tactics that federal prosecutors
have adopted since the wave of corporate scandals that erupted after the collapse
of Enron."); Stephanie A. Martz, Report from the Front Lines: The Thompson Memo
and the KPMG Tax Shelter Case, WALL ST. LAWYER, Aug. 2006, available at
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Judge Kaplan's Due ProcessAnalysis

In reaching his conclusion that prosecutors' actions
violated the defendants' rights to due process, Judge Kaplan
ruled that the right to fairness in the pre-trial stage of a
criminal proceeding is essential to liberty, and thus subject to
the highest judicial standard of review, strict scrutiny.13 As a
result, a defendant's right to a fair proceeding "cannot be
infringed by the government unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."13 5 Such
an application of strict scrutiny in the context of criminal
proceedings is significant, as Kaplan made this assertion
despite the fact that even he readily admitted that "[tihe right
to fairness in criminal proceedings has not been explicitly so
characterized by the [Supreme] Court."136
For legal precedent, Judge Kaplan first pointed to
various important stages of a criminal proceeding where, the
Supreme Court has ruled, the government cannot use its power
to unfairly disadvantage the defendant by restricting access to
evidence. 137 Next, he claimed that past Supreme Court cases
really were decided under the strict scrutiny standard even
though the Court never explicitly stated as much. 13 8 To support
this proposition, Kaplan points to language used by the Second
Circuit and other lower court opinions, 139 as well commentary
14
by legal scholars. 0
Under the strict scrutiny test for fairness in a criminal
proceeding, Kaplan wrote that the standard of review "not only
prevents the prosecution from interfering actively with the
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews042; David Z. Seide, Compelled
Waivers of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 235, 239-42
(2006).
134 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
135 Id. at 360.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 356-60. Kaplan pointed to "what might loosely be called the area of
constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." Id. at 358. To read about this right in
detail, see supra Part III.B. Kaplan also wrote that prosecutors are required to act
fairly, by neither intentionally delaying indictments nor obstructing a defendant's
access to a witness. Id. at 359.
138 Id. at 360. ("[M]any of the Supreme Court's criminal due process
decisions ... can be understood in modern terms most readily in the substantive due
process and strict scrutiny framework.").
139 Id. at 361 nn.154-55. Kaplan depends on an extensive list of cases, but it is
worth noting that none of them explicitly and definitively state that the entire criminal
process should be judged under the standard of strict scrutiny.
140 Id. at 361 n.156.
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defense, but also from passively hampering the defendant's
efforts."''4 By pressuring KPMG to refuse to advance sufficient
legal fees to its employees who were concurrently being
personally investigated, the U.S. Attorney's Office ("USAO"), in
Kaplan's estimation, clearly did not abide by this standard.
Thus, the federal prosecutors abrogated KPMG's employees'
right to a fair trial.
Legal fees for corporate employees in similar past
lawsuits have accrued well into the millions of dollars. This is a
sum of money that these employees naturally did not possess.
Judge Kaplan therefore ruled that without a company
commitment to advance its employees' legal fees, the employees
would be left without funds sufficient to mount an adequate
defense, thereby denying them their constitutionally protected
right to due process. 4 2 Thus, if the government's acts did not
consist of active interference, at the very least this conduct
passively but impermissibly impeded the employee defendants'
efforts to defend themselves.
In essence, Kaplan ruled that the government failed the
strict scrutiny test because the government's stated reasons for
its actions were not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest. The USAO claimed that its compelling interests
were to asses KPMG's level of cooperation, increase the
government's capability to successfully investigate and
prosecute white-collar crime by ensuring that the company was
not paying "hush money,"14 and to punish those whom
prosecutors believed were guilty.'Kaplan struck down the government's first two alleged
compelling interests because they could be accomplished more
narrowly and just as effectively by undergoing a case-by-case
analysis of which specific companies under investigation need
to have pressure exerted upon them. 14 By contrast, the
Thompson Memorandum broadly compelled such acts of
1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
142 Id. at 362.
143 "Hush money" in this context refers to the government's concern that
141 Stein

companies will bribe its employees by paying their legal fees in return for the
employees' implicit promise of less-than-full disclosure when discussing with the
government the possible condemnable actions by directors. This worry stems from the
fact that the employees will have a great need for this money, as the alternative of
paying their own legal fees is quite formidable. For an example of the expenses
required for an employee to pay for his own litigation expenses, see infra note 165.
144 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
141 Id. at 363-64.
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indiscriminate pressure on all companies and their employees,
even when there was no sound reason to believe such
obstruction of justice schemes would occur. 146 Kaplan ruled that
the third reason was impermissible as well because the
discretion to punish is exclusively in the realm of Congress and
the judiciary. Any attempt by the prosecutors to punish before
the defendant is found guilty is an "abuse of power" and thus
not a legitimate government interest.147 As a result, the
prosecutors' acts were not narrowly tailored and therefore
violated the newly created strict scrutiny due process standard
of review for fairness in a criminal proceeding.
C.

Judge Kaplan's Sixth Amendment Analysis

Judge Kaplan was not content to stop at raising the due
process standard the government must meet to justify
impinging upon a defendant's rights in the pre-trial stage of a
criminal proceeding.148 Kaplan extended defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights as well by stating that defendant employees
who are not advanced legal fees by their employer are
consequently being denied their right to "adequate assistance
of counsel." 149 To reach this conclusion, Kaplan continued
extending defendants' rights by making assertions that courts
in the past have been hesitant to make.150
First, to the vexation of the government, Kaplan ruled
that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights commence not at
the start of an official judicial proceeding,151 but rather may be
implicated when the government limits a defendant's access to
resources that may be required to adequately defend him- or
herself.15 2 There was little precedent for the idea that a
146

Id. "[Tihe Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of legal fees

may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a means to obstruct an investigation.
costs weighs
Indeed, the text strongly suggests that advancement of defenses [sic]
against an organization independent of whether there is any [obstruction scheme]." Id
at 363. See generally Petra M. Reinecke & Douglas R. Schwartz, The Perils, Pitfalls
and Possible Demise of the Joint Defense Agreement in the Context of Shipboard
Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 17 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 29 (2005); Lawrence D.
Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate
America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111 (2003).
147 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
148 See supra Part IV.B.
149 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 365-67.
150 See infra notes 151-162
151 See supra note 73.
152 Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366. The government's argument that gave rise
to this issue is that the USAO claimed that the pressuring of KPMG to refuse to
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defendant's Sixth Amendment rights attach so early in the
adversarial process. 153 As the government argued, such
reasoning will certainly "open up the door" for future
defendants to argue that they have a right to pre-indictment
"adequate representation," particularly in the context of the
denial to resources.15
Next, Judge Kaplan rejected the government's
insistence that the court rely on the rationale of Strickland v.
Washington 15 to determine, as an initial inquiry, whether the
1
alleged wrongful conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. 56
Kaplan rejected this argument because the government's
conduct resulted in a "structural defect" that negatively
affected the entire criminal proceeding. 15 As a result, prejudice
was presumed, and the defendant did not have the burden to
prove the reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different but for the USAO's wrongful conduct. 158 As a
structural defect can only occur during a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding, 159 by implication, Kaplan's ruling makes
clear that the pre-trial stage must fit under this category. 6 °
Moreover, Kaplan ruled that the government may not
pressure a defendant to refrain from pursuing a legal strategy
in the course of litigation that the defendant is legally allowed
to pursue. 6 1 Denying the KPMG employees the right to receive
their employers' advancement of legal fees, Kaplan wrote, will
advance legal fees to its employees took place prior to any tribunal proceeding, and
precedent shows that Sixth Amendment rights do not attach until such a proceeding
begins. Id.
13 For support, Kaplan pointed to only one Ninth Circuit case, although it did
not involve wrongful government conduct. Id. at 366 n.176 (citing United States v.
Harrison, 213 F.3d 1206, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000)).
154 Id. at 366.
1' For a discussion of Strickland and its two-prong test, see supra notes 8185.
156 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
157 Id. at 370. For a discussion of the history and standard of review of a
.structural defect," see supra notes 90-97.
158 Kaplan ruled that the actions of the government caused a "structural
defect" because by being denied unlimited legal fee advancement, the KPMG employees
would be unable to defend themselves adequately during every stage of litigation, thus
infecting their entire defense. Id. at 370-72.
159 See supra notes 92-93.
16o Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371-72 ("[Alssessing the impact of pretrial
omissions and errors could require extensive evidentiary proceedings. In consequence,
it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which an error more properly could be said to
threaten to taint an entire proceeding.") (emphasis added).
161 Id.
at 372 ("[G]overnment interference with those resources that a
defendant does have or legally may obtain fundamentally alters the structure of the
adversary process.").

20071

U.S. V. STEIN AND INDIGENT DEFENSE

have the ultimate result of denying the employees the right to
defend themselves.162
Such government interference is particularly harmful in
light of the gross disparity in resources available between the
prosecution and defendants, especially if defendants are forced
to litigate without the aid of their employer. Without the
monetary assistance from their employers, corporate employees
will not be able to pay their lawyers to perform many of the
tasks essential to adequately represent their clients.163 For
instance, without assistance from KPMG, the defendants in
Stein were left unable to pay the substantial legal fees required
for their lawyers to review the millions of pages of documents,
interview more than a small percentage of the witnesses, or
consult with tax experts.Independently, this likely would not implicate any Sixth
Amendment issues. When one considers, however, that the
government directly caused this predicament by its acts of
pressure and coercion, coupled with the USAO's superior access
to resources, 165 Judge Kaplan ruled that the result was an
uneven playing field where the government wrongfully
manipulated the criminal proceeding. This infringement on the
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights caused the prosecution to
be at a severe advantage in comparison to its adversary, the
KPMG employees. As Kaplan wrote, the government's actions
"'create an appearance of impropriety that diminished faith in
the fairness of the criminal justice system in general."',-4 As a
result, Judge Kaplan ruled that the government, through its
wrongful conduct, was responsible for creating a structural
defect that violated the Sixth Amendment.

162

Id. at 368.

at 371 ("Properly defending this case, in all its complexity, has
required, and will continue to require, substantial financial resources.").
163

Id.

164

Id.

Id. at 371 n.205 (2006) ("At the time of this decision, the government
already had utilized their abundant resources to produce 'at least 5 to 6 million pages
of documents plus transcripts of 335 depositions and 195 income tax returns.'")
(internal citations omitted). Common sense dictates that an individual defending him
or herself will be unable to pay the legal fees to parse through even a small fraction of
those documents.
166 Id. at 372 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
165

U.S. 787, 811 (1987)).
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APPLYING THE STEIN ANALYSIS TO INDIGENT DEFENSE

When examining Judge Kaplan's ambitious analysis in
United States v. Stein, one must wonder if his groundbreaking
constitutional interpretation can also be used in other areas of
law where prosecutors are currently abusing their power to the
detriment of defendants. For example, when scrutinizing the
manner in which state prosecutors use their substantial power
to coerce indigent defendants, one cannot help but see a
parallel between the conduct of the AUSAs and that of many
state prosecutors.
Some may say that New York state prosecutors should
not be held accountable for withholding discovery information
and coercing as many plea deals as is possible, for they are
simply following the orders of their superiors, as well as the
laws laid out in the governing state statutes. 167 However, the
same also could have been said about the AUSAs who were
following the orders of the Thompson Memorandum to pressure
corporations under investigation not to advance legal fees to
their employees. Similar to how state prosecutors in New York
might not realize that their actions infringe on the rights of
indigent defendants, the federal prosecutors who were
following the Thompson Memorandum also likely were
unaware that their conduct was wrongful before Judge Kaplan
put an end to their practice by ruling that it was
unconstitutional. Therefore, if applying the rationale and
standards of review employed in Stein, another court could
certainly follow in Judge Kaplan's footsteps and rule that much
of the aforementioned conduct of state prosecutors is
unconstitutional as well.
As a result of Judge Kaplan's ruling, employees of large
companies-at least those in New York-can sleep easier at
night knowing that there is legal precedent under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments compelling federal prosecutors to treat
them fairly in the event of an investigation.1- Unfortunately,
the thousands of indigents in the state of New York enjoy no
such comfort. Those individuals in New York who are not
fortunate enough to possess the funds necessary to pay the

167

For a discussion of the relevant rules from the New York Criminal Penal

Law, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
168 See supra Part IV.B-C.
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astronomical fees of a private attorney 69 must expose
themselves to the "crisis" of the New York indigent defense
system.
In short, such an indigent defendant will likely be
represented by an attorney who barely has time to
communicate with the defendant or investigate on his or her
behalf.17 This defense attorney will also be advocating against
a state prosecutor who is probably under orders to refuse to
supply the defense attorney with crucial discovery information
until as late in the litigation process as is possible.171
Furthermore, the state prosecutor will be prone to use his or
her superior bargaining power, resulting from having greater
resources and access to information, to pressure the defendant

to waive pre-trial hearings and plead

guilty.172

It seems

inherently unfair for Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be
extended to wealthy corporate employees, but not equally
extended to these indigent defendants who are so poor that
they cannot afford to pay for their own defense. Stein, if
ambitiously and creatively analyzed, lays the constitutional
groundwork to put a stop to much of this unfortunate conduct
employed against indigent defendants.
A.

Applying Judge Kaplan's Due Process Standard
of Review

When Judge Kaplan ruled, for one of the first times in
judicial history,173 that a defendant's right to a fair criminal
proceeding is fundamental, he did not constrain the scope of
this ruling to any specific class of criminal litigation.74 Rather,
this strict scrutiny standard of review, which requires that the
prosecution's acts be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest, must be applied regardless of the occupations of
169

A private lawyer in New York who specializes in criminal defense of felony

crimes will typically charge an up-front fee upwards of $5,000 to $10,000, which will
rapidly increase the longer the criminal proceeding lasts. See, e.g., Hopkins & Kopilow,
http://www.lawinfo.com/expert/gardencitycriminallawyer (last visited Sept. 7, 2007);
Warren Redlich, http://www.redlichlaw.com/crim (last visited Sept. 7, 2007). Hourly
fees of criminal defense attorneys can cost up to hundreds of dollars per hour. See
generally Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillarof Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 588-90
(2005).
170 For a more in-depth discussion, see supra Part II.A.
171 For a more in-depth discussion, see supra Part II.B.
172 For a more in-depth discussion, see supra Part II.B.
173 See supra notes 135-136and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 134-136and accompanying text.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

the two adverse participants .175 This test not only "prevents the
prosecution from interfering actively with the defense, but also
from passively hampering the defendant's efforts." 176 Kaplan
applied this strict standard of review in the context of whitecollar corporate employees, but there is no reason why this
should be any different when applied in the context of state
government officials litigating against public defenders.
As per the convincing conclusions of the various reports
on the indigent defense system, as the system currently stands,
state prosecutors are not allowing for fair criminal
proceedings .177 Whether one classifies New York state
prosecutors' acts of ignoring the discovery standards plainly
laid out by both New York and ABA ethics rules178 as active
interference or passive hindrance of indigent defendants'
ability to most effectively defend themselves, the standard of
fairness in the state criminal justice system is unquestionably
crumbling. 179 Because a lack of resources already impedes a
public defender's ability to investigate, ° prosecutors should be
under a heavier burden to disclose evidence. 181 While
prosecutors might be able to justify nondisclosure under a less
scrutinized standard of review, such conduct will likely not
pass muster under Kaplan's pedestal of strict scrutiny.
Despite many possible claims used to justify
prosecutors' nondisclosure conduct, none of the policy reasons
that sympathizers often invoke to defend the suppression of
evidence against indigent defendants as a mechanism to
pressure plea deals is narrowly tailored enough to pass a strict
scrutiny test. To prove this, it is informative to look at three of
the most common justifications for the conduct.
One popular justification for using the Rosario rule 182 to
avoid disclosing lists of material witnesses and information
pertaining to those witnesses until the last possible second is

175
176
177

See supra notes 134-136and accompanying text.
Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
See discussion supra Part IL.B (regarding the

conclusions

of the

Spangenberg Report and Judge Kaye's Commission).
178 See supra note 48.
179 For an analysis of the current state of the indigent defense system in New
York, see discussion supra Part II.A.
180 See Part II.A.
181 Prosecutors have an ethical obligation to act in the interest of justice, and
not merely with the goal to convict. See supra note 39.
182 For a description of the Rosario rule, see supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.

20071

U.S. V. STEIN AND INDIGENT DEFENSE

the state's legitimate interest in protecting witnesses from
being victims of obstruction of justice.18 3 In other words,
prosecutors supposedly are concerned that defendants, if privy
to every witness willing to testify against them, would threaten
to injure the witnesses in an effort to silence them.- While
such a concern certainly has merit, it is not as narrowly
tailored as possible.
In Stein, Judge Kaplan used a strict scrutiny standard
of review for fairness in a criminal proceeding to invalidate the
Justice Department's conduct of pressuring corporations under
investigation to refrain from paying their employees' legal fees.
The Justice Department's claimed that such a broad approach
was necessary to prevent company directors from paying their
employees "hush money."s5 Judge Kaplan wrote that this could
be accomplished in a more narrowly tailored case-by-case
fashion, however, and found that the tactics demanded by the
Thompson Memorandum are permissible only if the fear that
company directors are paying "hush money" is reasonable given
the circumstances.186
Similarly, in the state prosecution context, a more
narrowly tailored approach could be employed to decide
obstruction of justice issues on a case-by-case basis. Under such
a narrowly tailored analysis, prosecutors would be permitted to
withhold witness information only from the specific defendants
who pose a reasonable threat to intimidate a witness, rather
than an entire class of defendants.18,7 Thus, while withholding
witness information until moments before a trial might be
permitted under a lesser standard of review, if a judge adopted
Judge Kaplan's analysis, a broad application of this practice of
M

183

See Too Little, Too Late, supra note 89, at 1148 ("The most common

argument against broad discovery is that allowing the defendant access to information
about witnesses will lead to interference with those witnesses. The claim is that the
defendant will try to convince potential prosecution witnesses to either change their
testimony or not testify at all, by bribing, threatening, physically injuring, or even
killing them.").
184 Besides making it more difficult for the prosecution to present a case, this
would also put witnesses in jeopardy of being put in harm's way.
185 See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
187 To take an extreme hypothetical example to make the point, a defendant
with a documented history of threatening witnesses, or even with a violent history,
would reasonably pose a threat to obstruct justice if given a witness list. However, a
defendant who was arrested for simply jumping a turnstile could not objectively be
considered a danger in this area.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

withholding information would not be likely to pass strict
scrutiny muster.'A broader claim commonly used to justify the
prosecutors' acts is the state's interest in avoiding judicial
waste. 189 By suppressing non-exculpatory evidence, but offering
more favorable plea deals or earlier access to discovery only
upon a waiver of pre-trial hearings and motions,19 prosecutors
arguably are achieving the state interest of limiting the
extraneous use of judicial resources. 9' In analyzing this
conduct under a rational or intermediate standard of review,
such conduct perhaps would be permissible because judicial
waste is a legitimate concern that overburdens New York's
state courts. 192 However, if one applies Judge Kaplan's analysis,
which considers the right to fairness in the criminal process to
be a fundamental liberty interest, a higher level of scrutiny
would be required. Under this heightened scrutiny, the
defendant's fundamental interest in the fairness of his or her

188 The government could point to United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002),
for an alternative proposition that at least concerning the impeachment of witnesses,
the Supreme Court has already ruled that such impeachment information need not be
disclosed, especially prior to a pre-trial plea deal. See supra notes 113-116 and
accompanying text. However, in addition to the other acceptable exceptions already
discussed (see supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text), the argument refuting the
involuntariness of a plea bargain under such circumstances is especially worrisome to
indigent defendants in state court who do not receive adequate discovery information.
Ruiz is distinguishable on its facts because it was litigated by federal defenders, who
have lighter case loads and greater resources, and whose opportunity to investigate is
much greater, than their state public defender counterparts. See generally Inga L.
Parsons, "MakingIt a Federal Case": A Model For Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 837 (1997). Therefore, the defendant in Ruiz had relatively substantial
resources available compared to a typical indigent defendant in state court. Unlike
indigent defendants in federal court, such defendants in state court often will find
themselves in a predicament where they must plea, even if innocent, because the lack
of investigation at their disposal renders them unable to adequately calculate the risk
of a guilty verdict if the case were to proceed to trial.
189 See Green, supra note 60, at 1193; see also Eli. J. Richardson, Taking Issue
with Issue Preclusion:Reinventing CollateralEstoppel, 65 MISS. L.J. 41, 41 n.3 (1995)
("Excessive litigation is becoming a greater concern with each passing year.. .
9 See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
191 For the purposes of this Note, the author assumes that such actions will
achieve the desired goal of creating a lesser caseload. However, no study has proven
that disclosing material evidence at an earlier stage will lead to more courtroom
litigation. To the contrary, it is quite possible that the same percentage of pleas would
occur if there were broader discovery, but the results would be more equitable because
defendants would have more information, allowing them to make better-informed
decisions.
192 See Mike McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social
DisciplinaryModel of CriminalJustice, 42 SOC. PROBS. 216, 224 (1995) (describing the
pressures put on judges in New York City to effectuate guilty pleas as a means to
decrease the number of cases); see also Green, supra note 60, at 1193.
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criminal proceeding outweighs the state's interest in
193
effectuating fewer cases.
Finally, a third legitimate state interest put forth to
justify the prosecutors' conduct is the desire to simultaneously
prosecute and deter crime, effectively punishing the accused
by making the criminal process as difficult and as trying
as possible. However, under Judge Kaplan's rationale, any
government conduct having the purpose of punishing the
defendant before that defendant is found guilty is analogous to
the federal prosecutors' unconstitutional use of the Thompson
Memorandum as a mechanism to punish the accused.19 Such a
desire is an impermissible "abuse of power" that does not pass
a strict scrutiny analysis.
Even if the government's goal is the efficient
prosecution of crime without any desire of punishment,
common sense dictates that under strict scrutiny analysis, the
most narrowly tailored approach to put those who commit
crimes behind bars is to do so with as great a degree of
accuracy as possible, ensuring that those who plead guilty are
in fact guilty. Violating ethical standards that have been put in
place by both the ABA and the New York State Disciplinary
195
Board does not most narrowly accomplish this objective.
Despite the presumption of innocence that is the credo
in the United States, an indigent defendant who has a criminal
background and who faces potentially biased witnesses, a
potentially biased jury, and counsel who lacks the time or
resources necessary to investigate the credibility of those
witnesses might reasonably believe that the cards are stacked
so high against him that the best strategy is to plead guilty to a
lesser sentence despite his innocence. 196 Nevertheless, if state
prosecutors were made to be more forthcoming in their
discovery disclosure procedures, an indigent's counsel might
learn important information, such as evidence concerning a

193 See E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the
Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 42 (1992-93) ("[Ilntermediate judicial
scrutiny is enacted . .. so that a needless waste of resources is avoided.") (emphasis
added).
194 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
196 As stated earlier, agreeing to a plea bargain under such dire

circumstances, where the defendant does not have access to various forms of material
information cannot truly be considered "voluntary." See supra notes 117-122 and
accompanying text.
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witness's background suggesting the witness lacks credibility.
Therefore, coercing all defendants to plead guilty regardless of
the social cost is not the most narrowly tailored approach to
prosecuting crime.
B.

Applying the Sixth Amendment Standardof Review

In United States v. Stein, Judge Kaplan was not content
to state that the USAO was only violating the KPMG
employees' due process rights.197 Kaplan continued his
constitutional analysis and ruled that the defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to adequate counsel was also denied.198
Despite the fact that Sixth Amendment rights typically attach
upon indictment, 199 Kaplan not only extended this right to
attach pre-indictment,200 but also impliedly included the pretrial stage of litigation as a critical stage where prejudice could
be presumed.201 As a result, the federal prosecutors' acts of
denying the KPMG employees access to the resources
necessary to provide for an adequate defense was a Sixth
Amendment violation. Similarly, indigent defendants under
the current system in New York face an analogous
predicament, as the government denies them access to the
resources needed for sufficient representation during the newly
anointed "critical" pre-trial stage of litigation. Therefore, under
Kaplan's line of reasoning, indigent defendants in New York
are having their Sixth Amendment rights violated as well.
After Stein, judges in New York may reasonably follow
Judge Kaplan's rationale by holding that Sixth Amendment
rights apply to indigent defendants regardless of the litigation
stage where the harm originally occurs. First, the enormous
disparity in resources that New York State gives to prosecutors
as compared to public defenders 2°2 arguably can bring up Sixth
Amendment issues even without focusing on the prosecutors'
conduct.203 Second, even though the state prosecutors' acts of
197

LV.B.

198

IV.C.
73.
courts have emphasized the importance of pre-indictment

See supra Part
See supra Part
199 See supra note
20 Although past

representation, they have been hesitant to rule that Sixth Amendment rights attach at
such an early stage. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
202 See supra Part IV.C.
203 One can certainly make a case that the lack of resources provided by New
York State to public defender offices denies indigent defendants the right to "adequate
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defying ABA and New York State ethics rules-by suppressing
material evidence and then coercing defendants to waive their
rights to pre-trial hearings204--occur prior to indictment, a
judge now has precedent holding that this can be a Sixth
Amendment violation, even in this earliest stage of litigation.
In Stein, Judge Kaplan also ruled that the pre-trial
stage of litigation could be a critical point in the adjudicative
proceedings where a violation "infects" the entire trial from
beginning to end.205 As a consequence, this results in a
structural defect where prejudice need not be proved, but
rather is presumed,206 because the likelihood that any
competent lawyer could provide effective aid is so minute that
20 7
no inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial is necessary.
The AUSAs in Stein threatened to "contaminate" the case from
beginning to end by virtue of their pre-trial acts of obstructing
the defendant-employees' ability to obtain sufficient resources
to defend themselves properly.208
Similarly, state prosecutors throughout New York, by
also denying indigent defendants access to resources-in this
representation." See supra note 27. In fact, in New York County Lawyers'Association. v.
New York, Judge Suarez ruled that the inadequate levels of compensation that the
State of New York paid its public defenders violated the Sixth Amendment. 745
N.Y.S.2d 376, 383-85 (Sup. Ct. 2002.). In light of this, it is not a stretch to rule that
lack of funds to investigate, the inability to meet with clients, and other problems
violate the right to "adequate representation" without even focusing on wrongful
prosecutorial behavior. See discussion supra Part II.A. In a related case, New York
County Lawyers' Association v. New York, 763 N.Y.S. 2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 2003), Judge
Suarez struck down statutory compensation caps also as a Sixth Amendment violation
as applied. As he eloquently opened his decision,
the most vulnerable in our society, children and indigent adults, appear in
courts without advocates to champion or defend their causes. The
pusillanimous posturing and procrastination of the executive and legislative
branches have created the assigned counsel crisis impairing the judiciary's
ability to function. This pillar is essential to the stability of our political
system. It should therefore be continually strengthened and not allowed to
crumble into the detritus of a constitutional imbalance among the branches of
government. Equal access to justice should not be a ceremonial platitude, but
a perpetual pledge vigilantly guarded.
Id. at 398-99.
204 See discussion supra Part II.B.
205 See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
206 As stated above, see discussion supra Part ILA, public defenders have such
little time to devote to each defendant, they often never receive the discovery
information helpful to make an informed decision on whether to accept a plea
agreement. Furthermore, if they do go to trial, prosecutors supply material evidence to
them so late in the game that public defenders are further hindered from using use this
evidence effectively. See discussion supra Part II.B.
207 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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case evidence-at the critical pre-trial stage of a criminal
proceeding, create a structural defect that results in the
contamination of the entire proceeding. By failing to disclose
witness lists and other material evidence, prosecutors render
indigent defendants uninformed as to how to best defend
themselves. If a defendant agrees to a plea without access to
material evidence, the entire criminal proceeding has been
irrevocably affected. Similarly, when a defendant is pressured
to waive his or her right to important pre-trial hearings, the
ramification of such a decision could detrimentally affect the
duration of the criminal proceeding as well.
Had the pre-trial stage of litigation never been
considered a critical stage, it would be far more difficult for a
judge to conclude that a Sixth Amendment violation arose from
New York's indigent defense crisis. A judge would have to rule
that there existed a "reasonable probability" that the outcome
of a given case would have been different had the defect not
existed. Judge Kaplan, however, by implicitly ruling that the
pre-trial stage could be classified as critical,29 makes such a
ruling much easier. Because the pre-indictment unethical acts
by state prosecutors clearly infect the duration of an indigent
defendant's criminal proceeding,21 a judge relying on Stein's
reasoning could find that the system as it currently operates
leads to violations of the Sixth Amendment right to adequate
representation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent from the research compiled by the
Spangenberg Group that the current indigent defense system
in New York is in dire need of reform in order to balance the
playing field between state prosecutors and public defenders.211
A system where overworked public defenders have more access
to evidence held by state prosecutors is essential to achieve any
semblance of fairness. Unfortunately, absent drastic actions on
the part of the New York legislature, the burden to improve the
current system must fall on the judiciary. Formulating a
possible solution to this problem will be quite difficult,
however, because even though the prosecutors' conduct is
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contrary to their ethical obligations,212 such acts are
nevertheless legal under the governing New York law.213 The
courts, however, have spurred change in New York criminal
procedure law in the past. New York judges need to look no
further than forty-five years ago, when in People v. Rosario a
New York state court essentially created new criminal
procedure laws, which the legislature subsequently codified.214
Such judiciary action must take place again.
In United States v. Stein, Judge Kaplan used Fifth and
Sixth Amendment analysis to strike down a common practice
that federal prosecutors used to disadvantage employee
defendants. 1.5 If New York judges use the same rationale, they
could put a stop to the unethical conduct employed by state
prosecutors to severely disadvantage indigent defendants.16
Considering the Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on the
importance of discovery in criminal cases,217 as well as Stein's
extension of Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles, the time is
ripe for New York judges to use their power to curb the power
of prosecuting attorneys.
An ambitious jurist who finds him- or herself on the
bench ruling on a similar situation of institutional unfairness
as the hypothetical case of Francisco Rodriguez2 18 has a newly
minted opportunity. Precedent now exists allowing a court to
find that excessive government conduct, although acceptable
under New York Criminal Procedure Law, violates Article I,
Section 6 of the New York Constitution, as well as the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. This court
would then have the ability, like the court in Rosario, to put
forward a new set of rules that is more equitable to all parties
involved.
While the broader discovery rules one hopes will
eventually govern New York criminal law need not go so far as
to permit open discovery in all criminal cases, the rules ought
to take into account applicable ethical standards, more so than
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the restrictive Rosario rule currently allows.219 In fact, an
excellent model for discovery rules that are more in line with
current ethical standards is located just across the river-the
state of New Jersey's criminal procedure law, which, for
example, compels mandatory discovery at the time of a pretrial plea offer.220
Such mandatory discovery rules meet the ABA's
recommendations of providing for discovery at an earlier stage
of the criminal proceeding.221 Such rules would also mitigate
the inequitable differences between the prosecution and public
defenders.222 Regardless of the specifics of the rules ultimately
settled upon, if a judge following United States v. Stein has the
vision to create a new set of criminal discovery laws that
comport with Judge Kaplan's notions of fairness under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution, indigents
such as Francisco Rodriguez will finally have the opportunity
to get a fair shake.
Marc Sackint

See supra notes 44-47.
See N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a) (2003) ("Where the prosecutor has made a preindictment plea offer, the prosecutor shall upon request permit defense counsel to
inspect and copy or photograph any relevant material which would be discoverable
following an indictment . . . ."); see also N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(c)(6) ("The prosecutor shall
permit defendant to inspect and copy or photograph ... names and addresses of any
persons whom the prosecutor knows to have relevant evidence or information including
a designation by the prosecutor as to which of those persons may be called as
witnesses.").
221 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Standard 11-4.1(a).
222 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Standard 11.1.1(a)(v).
t B.A., University of Michigan, 2003; J.D. candidate, Brooklyn Law School,
2008. Thanks to everyone at the Brooklyn Law Review for their endless efforts. Special
thanks to Stuart and Sharon Sackin, and especially Erin Hendriks, for their love and
support.
219
220

